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ABSTRACT:
As part of an ongoing effort at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to enhance 
analytical models that simulate enrichment and conversion facilities, efforts are underway to 
develop routines to estimate the total gamma-ray flux and that of specific lines around process 
piping containing UF6. The intent of the simulation modeling effort is to aid in the identification 
of possible areas where material diversion could occur, as input to an overall safeguards strategy. 
The operation of an enrichment facility for the production of low enriched uranium (LEU) 
presents certain proliferation concerns, including both the possibility of diversion of LEU and the 
potential for producing material enriched to higher-than-declared, weapons-usable levels. 
Safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are designed to provide 
assurance against diversion or misuse. Among the measures being considered for use is the 
measurement of radiation fields at various locations in the cascade hall. Our prior efforts in this 
area have focused on developing a model to predict neutron fields and how they would change 
during diversion of misuse. The neutron models indicated that while neutron detection useful in 
monitoring feed and product containers, it was not useful for monitoring process lines. Our 
current effort is aimed at developing algorithms that provide estimates of the gamma radiation 
field outside any process line for the purpose of determining the most effective locations for 
placing in-plant gamma-monitoring equipment. These algorithms could also be modified to 
provide both dose and spectral information and, ultimately, detector responses that could be 
physically measured at various points on the process line. Such information could be used to 
optimize detector locations in support of real-time on-site monitoring to determine the 
enrichment levels within a process stream. The results of parametric analyses to establish 
expected variations for several different process streams and configurations are presented. The 
benefits and issues associated with both passive and active interrogation measurement techniques 
are also being explored.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has provided funding to LLNL for developing tools and 
methods for potential U.S. use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems used in 
enrichment facilities [1]. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is also assessing the 
needs and capabilities necessary to and efficiently safeguard enrichment plants. An IAEA hosted 
technical meeting in Vienna on April 18-22, 2005 aimed at further strengthening inspection and 
verification approaches applied to uranium enrichment activities.
The current efforts focus on providing continued information that can be used in identifying the 
placement and effectiveness of safeguards in protecting against the possible diversion of 
attractive materials and unauthorized activities at enrichment plants. It is part of a multi-
2laboratory DOE project, following on from an earlier examination of possible safeguards for 
natural uranium conversion plants [2, 3].
Based on earlier work, a tool suite has been put together for safeguards analysis, the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory LLNL (LLNL) Integrated Safeguards System Analysis Tool 
(LISSAT) [4]. LISSAT provides a framework for performing systems analysis and evaluating 
the effectiveness of a safeguard system for a nuclear fuel cycle facility. As a part of the LISSAT 
suite of tools, a development effort has been undertaken to build a set of routines that can be 
utilized anywhere in the simulation to identify the neutron and gamma flux and associated 
detector responses. The intent of this effort is to aid in the placement of radiation detection 
instrumentation to most effectively identify when diversion of material is taking place.
In a previous paper [5], we described efforts undertaken to develop a routine to provide neutron 
levels around process piping and feed and product containers. In the present paper, current 
efforts and results are described that cover the development of a routine that provides gamma 
flux levels around process lines anywhere in an enrichment facility. 
DERIVATION OF RADIATION SOURCE TERM
The approach of the current efforts is to provide a simple set of algorithms that can provide 
reasonable values for both the neutron and gamma flux outside a line or container carrying either 
UF6 gas or UF6 as a solid or liquid. These algorithms are subsequently incorporated into the 
LISSAT suite of tools to model a uranium enrichment plant. The neutron routine previously 
presented [5] indicated that variations in enrichment levels would be detectable due to neutrons 
emanating from assumed product containers.  However neutron levels emanating from process 
lines did not lend themselves to easy detection of changes in enrichment levels with process 
lines. This was due to the low gas density and small pipe diameters employed at enrichment 
facilities resulting in a low (a,n) production in the gas before the alphas were lost to the pipe 
walls, and because of interference from neutrons generated at other locations. Consequently 
efforts were devoted to develop an initial gamma routine to provide gamma flux levels around 
process piping that would indicate the degree of fluctuations with respect to changes in the 
enrichment levels. The intent of the development efforts is to allow one to predict the radiation 
fields that might be expected under certain diversion scenarios to support the identification and 
placement of appropriate radiation detectors in the field. At the present time, efforts are aimed at 
the determination of the radiation fields that might be seen by a detector, follow-on efforts would 
correlate the expected radiation fields with the anticipated detector responses. 
The determination of the radiation fields was broken up into two basic parts. The first part was to 
quantify the neutron source term and resulting flux depending upon the physical geometry 
encountered. The results of these initial efforts were previously reported [5]. The second part of 
the effort as discussed in this paper is to quantify the gamma source term and resulting flux again 
as a function of the basic geometry encountered. In both instances, as the application is for a 
uranium enrichment plant wherein numerous pipes exist to transport material within the process 
and both feed and product containers were cylindrical, the source was assumed to be represented 
by a cylinder of varying diameters and lengths. Since the enrichment levels vary, depending 
upon where in the process one might be performing an interrogation, the source terms for both 
the neutrons and gammas were defined for each uranium isotope separately. Once defined, the 
3source term for any mix (i.e., level of enrichment) could be defined by varying the source 
strengths from each uranium isotope according to its percentage in the overall mix. 
Gamma source term and flux determination
Gammas arise due to the decay of the various uranium isotopes, the subsequent decay of the 
daughter products and that due to spontaneous and neutron induced fission and the subsequent 
decay of the fission products. The gamma source term was based on the LLNL computer code 
GAMGEN [6] and NUREG/CR-5550 [7]. The source term included both the specific activity 
and energy spectrum from each radionuclide 234U, 235U, and 238U. GAMGEN accounts for decay 
of both parent and subsequent daughters but does not account for either spontaneous or induced 
fission gammas or those of the fission products produced. However since the half-life for 
spontaneous fission is much less than that of decay, both spontaneous and neutron induced 
fission gammas are neglected. It was assumed that daughter products would not be volatilized 
when the feed container was heated and hence the amount of time from process filling of the 
feed container to arrival at the enrichment plant could be neglected. The amount of time the 
uranium hexafluoride gas would remain within the enrichment process piping was taken as an 
hour and hence an hour of decay time was used to determine the gamma source strength using 
GAMGEN. The source strength was given as specific activity, gammas emitted per unit time and 
mass (g/cm2-s). While most of the known gamma lines were tracked, those given in Table 1 were 
those tabulated.
Table 1 Gamma Lines Selected for Tabulation
Radionuclide Associated Gamma Energies (MeV)
234U 0.45497 0.50353
235U 0.09336 0.14376 0.18572 0.20531
238U 0.09235 0.09278 0.11280 0.76641
The gamma flux at a point perpendicular to a distance D from the midpoint of a pipe of length L
containing a gamma source Si per unit length of pipe has been treated as that of a line source as 
given by Equation (1). This was felt to be a good approximation for the types of gas densities 
and pipe sizes of interest. The adjustment factor ADJi is a correction factor that accounts in part 
for the finite source behavior of the pipe. The adjustment factor was determined by comparing 
the ideal line source behavior with that determined from various MNCP [8] analyses. The source 
term, Si, per isotope i, as given by Equation (2), is calculated based on the pipe diameter d, the 
density of UF6 gas within the pipe r, the fractional isotopic mix fi , and the specific gamma 
activity SAi. The determination of the total gamma flux is based on a weighted average of the 
flux contributions from each of the uranium nuclides as given by Equation (3). The approach 
utilized is accurate within a few percent up to UF6 densities on the order of 0.01 g/cm3. Densities 
greater than 0.01 g/cm3 begin to vary from a simple line source due to self-absorption as shown 
in Figure 1. As can be seen by examining Figure 1, the flux starts to vary as the gas density 
approaches 0.01 g/cm3 indicating the point at which self absorption begins to become important.
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Figure 1. Effect of gas density on relative gamma flux.
The relative Gamma Flux (cm-2) in Figure 1 is the ratio of the flux at a defined point in units of 
(g/cm2-s) divided by the total gamma emission rate contained in the source in units of (g/s). The 
relative flux decreases with pipe length because the ends of the pipe are further from the defined 
point and decreases with increasing gas density due to the increase of self absorption within the 
gas.
Results of Gamma Source Term Modeling
Applying the expressions given in Equations (1), (2) and (3), Figure 2 shows the gamma flux for 
various levels of enrichment as a function of distance from the center of a 1 foot long section of 
pipe having a diameter of 0.5 inches and a UF6 density of 0.001 g/cm3. As the level of 
enrichment increases, the source term increases, as the specific activity of 238U is the lowest of 
the 3 naturally occurring uranium isotopes. Hence, the total gamma flux increases.
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Figure 2. Gamma flux versus 235U enrichment at 1 ft from a 1-ft long ½-inch pipe
In incorporating the routine into the LISSAT suite of tools, several additional algorithms were 
written so as to extract the necessary information from the enrichment plant model required to 
use the radiation source term routine. In particular, the gas density is not a property that the 
modeling code calculates. However, the pressure at which the system is operating is in principle 
known. As a consequence, Equation (4) was written, utilizing the ideal gas law, to compute the 
density r in g/cm3 of UF6 gas given the line pressure P in bars and ambient or operating 
temperature T in centigrade.
( )16.273
234.4
+
×
=
T
Pr (4)
For example, at T = 25 °C and P = 0.050 bars, r = 0.00071 g/cm3. 
The following section illustrates the results obtainable from the modeling code with the radiation 
source term routine as incorporated in LISSAT.
SIMULATION RESULTS
The gamma flux module was integrated into the Extend simulation model for the generic 
enrichment facility [4]. The measurement point for the gamma flux is assumed to be about 1 ft 
from a process line containing the diverted UF6 having an enrichment of 50% 235U. Figure 3 
shows the increase in gamma flux emanating from the process line as the section of pipe 
6collimated increases and hence a detector’s view. The detector would be located as close to the 
process line as reasonably possible so as to maximize the gamma flux. At the same time, the 
view would be collimated to minimize the contributions due to scattering and that due to other 
process lines. As can be seen by examining Figure 3, a reasonable flux can be obtained by 
viewing roughly 2 feet of pipe.
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Figure 3. Gamma flux at 1 ft from a process line with UF6 gas at 50% enrichment.
FUTURE EFFORTS
The initial approach of our efforts was to develop a fast running routine that would provide both 
neutron and gamma fluxes. At the present time, efforts are continuing to increase the range of the 
gamma routine to provide gamma flux levels at solid densities so that the flux from both feed 
and product containers can be determined. In addition, the routine is to be modified to provide 
flux levels for the specific lines previously given in Table 1. Plans are to couple the flux and 
energy spectrum into both a neutron and gamma detector to provide its response. 
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